Technê, Phronêsis, and The Lion King

In response to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, I will attempt to make sense of Aristotelian technê and phronêsis as they relate to rhetoric with help as needed from Alan Gross’s “What Aristotle Meant by Rhetoric” and Barbara Warnick’s “Judgement, Probability, and Aristotle’s Rhetoric.” Try to follow along :) 

Although the Nic. Eth. does not directly comment on rhetoric itself, inferences on rhetoric can be made from what Aristotle has to say about technê. Gross reiterates Warnick’s theory on Aristotelian rhetoric as technê because “it is a productive art, and only a productive art. Rhetoric is, in Aristotle’s scheme of things, a narrowly circumscribed set of skills” (Gross 24). But if rhetoric is a technê, then what is technê? It is a key term that recurs across the Aristotelian corpus meaning art in its most broadest sense. More specifically, technê is a productive art because it is capable of leading to action. Technê is the knowledge of the available means to make something, not the making of art or what art makes. This is because technê is not concerned with actions nor invariables. Rather, it is more like a toolbox one owns whose tools are available to use but must be applied appropriately for the most efficient use. Technê “is concerned with coming into being, i.e. with contriving and considering how something may come into being” (Aristotle 141). In other words, it is concerned with the reasoning required to determine appropriate action for the variable condition.

Again, technê is not action. Actualization can occur with phronêsis (practical wisdom). It, like technê, is concerned with the variables of human affairs. For Aristotle, phronêsis is “a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods” (143). “True” and “goods” stand out in this definition; once again we are dealing with terms like virtue, Truth, and goodness, but unlike in Plato (philosopher/sophia) who seeks to define these terms, we seek to employ them. Anyway, phronêsis must be coupled with technê for just action to occur... where technê is the reasoning for appropriate action, phronêsis is the just basis for the reasoning.  

So, technê as a productive art is rhetoric... phronêsis as practical wisdom is politics (I think?). Deliberation is the state of reasoning that connects and catalyzes the two.

“Excellence in deliberation” takes into account that “the good state is truth in agreement with desire” (149, 139). Deliberation results in action; “the origin of action - its [hothen], not its [hou heneka] - is choice” (139, Gross); therefore deliberation is choice. However, choice is comprised of two parts: reasoning and desire. So, deliberation is the reasoning part of choice. The desire part is phronêsis: “what is good for themselves and what is good for men in general” (143). When phronêsis moderates deliberation, a good choice results and deliberation is then excellent.

I guess an example of this can be found in the Mufasa Ghost scene in The Lion King. In this scene, Simba is struggling with whether he should return to Pride Rock and reclaim his place as king. It’s up to Rafiki, his incorporeal father, and most especially himself to convince him to act. (Now that I think about it, this is probably a bad example since this is more of an internal conflict and self-persuasion rather than a mob... I’m forcing this one, but just go with me on this.) I would like to begin at (what I think is) the enthymeme, 1:38-2:07.

Rafiki states, “He lives in you.” Mufasa states, “You have forgotten me. You have forgotten who you are and so have forgotten me.” Rather than unpack the obvious, I would just like to note (and reiterate from last week) that the enthymeme is associated with rhetoric. Enthymemes are “reasoning forms . . . collapsed and simplified and its starting points are accepted opinions rather than conclusions” (Warnick 305). So, the enthymeme is tool of rhetoric, an available mean for persuasion. 

I believe the vision of Mufasa takes place in Simba’s head. So, rather than think of Mufasa or even Rafiki as the rhetor speaking to Simba, think of it as Simba speaking to himself. Simba then is the one who is in deliberation, reasoning and desiring, choosing and acting. What makes this excellent deliberation is its correctness in the virtuous sense. Rhetoric, the enthymeme, is employed as it should be, as “a tool always to be used for the good of the citizen and the city-state” (Gross 34). If you watch the whole scene, you see that Simba is persuaded to act for his and his pride’s best interest. Phronêsis is the desire for what is best; technê is rhetoric and its reasoning enthymeme. These together are choice and the origin of actualization.

But what if one deliberates without phronêsis? Consider Scar’s role as antagonist in The Lion King along with this video.

Again, “excellence in deliberation will be correctness with regard to what conduces to the end which practical wisdom apprehends truly” (Aristotle 151). It is possible to deliberate without phronêsis, however, this is simply reasoning. Excellent deliberation looks to practical wisdom because phronêsis desires what is best for the deliberator and  man in general. This ends up going back Socrates’ beef with rhetoric in general... rhetoric’s potential to be abused, noted by Gross and Warnick. When the ethical limits of rhetoric are removed and speakers “persuade in any way they can,” you have Scar (Gross 34).

Remember, choice is both reason and desire. In Scar’s case, phronêsis is removed and does not factor into desire. Rather, Scar’s desire is his own benefit: rule of Pride Rock. He feeds the hyenas what they want to hear (infinite food) to fulfill his agenda (listen to the back-and-forth difference in desire at 2:16-2:25) without considering what is best for them and the Pridelands as a whole. Aristotle would tag Scar’s temporary success as “mere smartness” (156). Despite Scar’s successful deliberation, Aristotle would think this: “the bad man, if he is clever, will reach as a result of his calculation what he sets before himself, so that he will have deliberated correctly, but he will have got for himself a great evil” (150). Scar does not have practical wisdom; he is clever, but in smartness and not noble laudability. 

Scar’s technê is rhetoric, nonetheless. He has knowledge of the available means of persuasion. He does not have phronêsis since he is unconcerned with the affairs of the state that do not pertain to him. Simba, on the other hand, deliberates with phronêsis. Both Scar’s and Simba’s actions originate from choice, and choice is both reason and desire. 

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. David Ross. New York: Oxford UP, 1998.

Gross, Alan G. "What Aristotle Meant by Rhetoric." Rereading Aristotle's Rhetoric. Eds. Alan G. Gross and Arthur E. Walzer. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 2000. 24-37.

Warnick, Barbara. "Judgement, Probability, and Aristotle's Rhetoric." Quarterly Journal of Speech 9 (1989): 299-311.