"Fixing a Hole" with Phaedrus

(I’m going on a big ol’ shameful stretch here...)

In discussing rhetoric with Phaedrus, Socrates and he conclude that rhetoric’s power is “in those things in which we are wandering” (263b). By this, they mean the obscure concepts, like love as introduced in Lysias’s speech, whose definition is disputable amongst different people and ourselves. The artless type of rhetoric, such as that exemplified by Lysias, does not establish definitions for conceptual language such as “love” but instead relies on the public to interpret it for themselves, so they are persuaded by likenesses/opinion rather than truth. In order to avoid this dispersion of opinion, one must “lead them into one idea, so that by defining each thing, he makes clear what, on each occasion, he wishes to teach about” (265d).

With this in mind, consider “Fixing a Hole” by The Beatles. While Paul McCartney had something different in mind when writing this song, I am toying with its lyrics and the ideas in Phaedrus in a playful exercise.

In the above context, one can imagine the song as a defense for a shameful speechwriter like Lysias. Take the first verse (any verse will do) for example: "I’m fixing a hole where the rain gets in, / and stops my mind from wandering / where it will go." For a shamefully persuasive speech to be successful, based in opinion rather than truth, the mind must be able to wander. The “hole” and “rain” are what prevent the mind from wandering just as a true definition based on knowledge does for who a speech is directed. By blocking the mind from knowing what something is, by denying definitions for what is being argued, a person is free to determine what something like “love” means for him/herself. The problem with this is stated in Socrates’ principle rule for fine deliberation: “One must know that which the deliberation is about, or else one necessarily misses the mark altogether” (237c). While Lysias does not assert a definition for love and leaves it free for interpretation for his audience, his speech turns into meaningless redundancy with little regard for structure, and as Socrates points out at one point, leaves Phaedrus admiring the speech’s display rather than its content.

Socrates’s approach to “love” and rhetoric is opposite of Lysias’s (and even himself when he refutes his first speech), so “Fixing a Hole” applies to his speeches differently as well. For Socrates, speeches are powerless in permanence, and therefore do not need to be written like Lysias’s for writing “will provide forgetfulness in the souls of those who have learned it, through neglect of memory . . . through trust in writing” (275a). What is written does not allow readers to think for themselves, trusting in likenesses rather truth, just like Phaedrus in his initial admiration for Lysias, because what is written cannot be refuted. So, in this context, the wandering mind from “Fixing a Hole” is like the one who writes for “the sake of play” to remind him/herself of the divine truth that Socrates describes in the chariot allegory (276d). When what is written turns into what “they recollect from outside with alien markings, not reminding themselves from inside, by themselves,” then writing has become the obstructing hole/rain (275a).

In the end, there are two ways the mind can wander. First, in an unintelligible way to understand undefined concepts based on opinion, likenesses, etc. In this way, it ceases to wander when what is disputable is defined. Second, in a way that seeks truth and knowledge, unable to wander if trusting in the reminder of likenesses.

Having been defeated by Phaedrus, I playfully conclude that, like Socrates, “it really doesn’t matter / if I’m wrong, I’m right.”

“Fixing a Hole.” The Beatles. Apple Corps, n.d. Web. 17 Sep. 2012.

Plato. Phaedrus. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. Print.